DeceptiveDevelopment targets freelance developers

Cybercriminals have been recognized to method their targets underneath the guise of firm recruiters, attractive them with faux employment presents. In any case, what higher time to strike than when the potential sufferer is distracted by the potential for getting a job? Since early 2024, ESET researchers have noticed a sequence of malicious North Korea-aligned actions, the place the operators, posing as headhunters, attempt to serve their targets with software program tasks that conceal infostealing malware. We name this exercise cluster DeceptiveDevelopment.

As a part of a faux job interview course of, the DeceptiveDevelopment operators ask their targets to do a coding take a look at, reminiscent of including a function to an present mission, with the recordsdata crucial for the duty often hosted on personal repositories on GitHub or different related platforms. Sadly for the keen work candidate, these recordsdata are trojanized: as soon as they obtain and execute the mission, the sufferer’s laptop will get compromised with the operation’s first-stage malware, BeaverTail.

DeceptiveDevelopment was first publicly described by Phylum and Unit 42 in 2023, and has already been partially documented underneath the names Contagious Interview and DEV#POPPER. Now we have carried out additional evaluation of this exercise cluster and its operator’s preliminary entry strategies, community infrastructure, and toolset, together with new variations of the 2 malware households utilized by DeceptiveDevelopment – InvisibleFerret, and the aforementioned BeaverTail.

Key factors of this blogpost:

• DeceptiveDevelopment targets freelance software program builders by means of spearphishing on job-hunting and freelancing websites, aiming to steal cryptocurrency wallets and login info from browsers and password managers.
• Energetic since not less than November 2023, this operation primarily makes use of two malware households – BeaverTail (infostealer, downloader) and InvisibleFerret (infostealer, RAT).
• DeceptiveDevelopment’s techniques, strategies, and procedures (TTPs) are much like a number of different recognized North Korea-aligned operations.

We first noticed this DeceptiveDevelopment marketing campaign in early 2024, once we found trojanized tasks hosted on GitHub with malicious code hidden on the finish of lengthy feedback, successfully shifting the code off-screen. These tasks delivered the BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware. Along with analyzing the 2 malware households, we additionally began investigating the C&C infrastructure behind the marketing campaign. Since then, now we have been monitoring this cluster and its advances in technique and tooling utilized in these ongoing assaults. This blogpost describes the TTPs of this marketing campaign, in addition to the malware it makes use of.

DeceptiveDevelopment profile

DeceptiveDevelopment is a North Korea-aligned exercise cluster that we at present don’t attribute to any recognized menace actor. Operators behind DeceptiveDevelopment goal software program builders on Home windows, Linux, and macOS. They primarily steal cryptocurrency for monetary achieve, with a potential secondary goal of cyberespionage.

To method their targets, these operators use faux recruiter profiles on social media, not in contrast to the Lazarus group in Operation DreamJob (as described on this WeLiveSecurity blogpost). Nevertheless, whereas Operation DreamJob focused protection and aerospace engineers, DeceptiveDevelopment reaches out to freelance software program builders, typically these concerned in cryptocurrency tasks. To compromise its victims’ computer systems, DeceptiveDevelopment supplies its targets with trojanized codebases that deploy backdoors as a part of a fake job interview course of.

Victimology

The first targets of this DeceptiveDevelopment marketing campaign are software program builders, primarily these concerned in cryptocurrency and decentralized finance tasks. The attackers don’t distinguish based mostly on geographical location and goal to compromise as many victims as potential to extend the probability of efficiently extracting funds and data.

Now we have noticed lots of of various victims world wide, utilizing all three main working programs – Home windows, Linux, and macOS. They ranged from junior builders simply beginning their freelance careers to extremely skilled professionals within the discipline. We solely noticed attacker–sufferer conversations in English, however can not say with certainty that the attackers won’t use translation instruments to speak with victims who don’t converse that language. A map exhibiting the worldwide distribution of victims may be seen in Determine 1.

Attribution

We think about DeceptiveDevelopment to be a North Korea-aligned exercise cluster with excessive confidence based mostly on a number of components:

• We noticed connections between GitHub accounts managed by the attackers and accounts containing faux CVs utilized by North Korean IT workers. These individuals apply for jobs in international corporations underneath false identities to be able to accumulate salaries to assist fund the regime. The noticed connections have been mutual follows between GitHub profiles the place one facet was related to DeceptiveDevelopment, and the opposite contained faux CVs and different materials associated to North Korean IT employee exercise. Comparable connections have been additionally noticed by Unit42. Sadly, the GitHub pages have been taken down earlier than we have been capable of document all of the proof.
• The TTPs (use of faux recruiters, trojanized job challenges, and software program used throughout interviews) are much like different North Korea-aligned exercise (Moonstone Sleet, and Lazarus’s DreamJob and DangerousPassword campaigns).

Along with the connections between the GitHub profiles, the malware utilized in DeceptiveDevelopment is quite easy. This tracks with the reporting executed by Mandiant claiming that the IT staff’ work is often of poor high quality.

Whereas monitoring DeceptiveDevelopment exercise, we noticed quite a few circumstances exhibiting a scarcity of consideration to element on the a part of the menace actors. In a few of them, the authors did not take away growth notes or commented-out native IP addresses used for growth and testing. We additionally noticed samples the place they appear to have forgotten to obfuscate the C&C tackle after altering it; this may be seen in Determine 2. Moreover, the malware makes use of freely out there obfuscation instruments with hyperlinks to them typically left in code feedback.

Technical evaluation

Preliminary entry

With a purpose to pose as recruiters, the attackers copy profiles of present individuals and even assemble new personas. They then both straight method their potential victims on job-hunting and freelancing platforms or put up faux job listings there. At first, the menace actors used model new profiles and would merely ship hyperlinks to malicious GitHub tasks through LinkedIn to their supposed targets. Later, they began utilizing profiles that seem established, with many followers and connections, to look extra reliable, and branched out to extra job-hunting and code-hosting web sites. Whereas a few of these profiles are arrange by the attackers themselves, others are probably compromised profiles of actual individuals on the platform, modified by the attackers.

A few of the platforms the place these interactions happen are generic job-hunting ones, whereas others focus totally on cryptocurrency and blockchain tasks and are thus extra according to the attackers’ objectives. The platforms embrace:

• LinkedIn,
• Upwork,
• Freelancer.com,
• We Work Remotely,
• Moonlight, and
• Crypto Jobs Record.

Probably the most generally noticed compromise vector consists of the faux recruiter offering the sufferer with a trojanized mission underneath the guise of a hiring problem or serving to the “recruiter” repair a bug for a monetary reward.

Victims obtain the mission recordsdata both straight through file switch on the location or by means of a hyperlink to a repository like GitHub, GitLab, or Bitbucket. They’re requested to obtain the recordsdata, add options or repair bugs, and report again to the recruiter. Moreover, they’re instructed to construct and execute the mission to be able to take a look at it, which is the place the preliminary compromise occurs. The repositories used are often personal, so the sufferer is first requested to offer their account ID or electronic mail tackle to be granted entry to them, almost certainly to hide the malicious exercise from researchers.

Regardless of that, we noticed many circumstances the place these repositories have been publicly out there, however realized that these belong principally to victims who, after finishing their duties, uploaded them to their very own repositories. Determine 3 reveals an instance of a trojanized mission hosted on GitHub. Now we have reported all noticed malicious code to the affected providers.

The trojanized tasks fall into considered one of 4 classes:

• hiring challenges,
• cryptocurrency tasks,
• video games (often with blockchain performance), and
• playing with blockchain/cryptocurrency options.

These repositories are sometimes duplicates of present open-source tasks or demos, with little to no change other than including the malicious code and altering the README file. A few of the malicious mission names and names of attacker-controlled accounts working them (the place we might assess them) are listed in Desk 1.

Desk 1. Noticed mission names and repository/commit authors

We additionally noticed the attackers impersonating present tasks and corporations through the use of related names or appending LLC, Ag, or Inc (abbreviations of authorized firm varieties) to the names, as seen in Desk 2.

Desk 2. Noticed mission names and repository/commit authors impersonating professional tasks

The attackers typically use a intelligent trick to cover their malicious code: they place it in an in any other case benign part of the mission, often inside backend code unrelated to the duty given to the developer, the place they append it as a single line behind an extended remark. This fashion, it’s moved off-screen and stays hidden until the sufferer scrolls to it or has the phrase wrap function of their code editor enabled. Apparently, GitHub’s personal code editor doesn’t allow phrase wrap, so the malicious code is straightforward to overlook even when taking a look at code within the repository, as proven in Determine 4.

One other compromise vector we noticed consisted of the faux recruiter inviting the sufferer to a job interview utilizing a web-based conferencing platform and offering a hyperlink to a web site from which the mandatory conferencing software program may be downloaded. The web site is often a clone of an present conferencing platform’s web site, as seen in Determine 5, and the downloaded software program comprises the primary stage of the malware.

Toolset

DeceptiveDevelopment primarily makes use of two malware households as a part of its actions, delivered in two phases. The primary stage, BeaverTail, has each a JavaScript and a local variant (written in C++ utilizing the Qt platform), and is delivered to the sufferer, disguised as part of a mission the sufferer is requested to work on, a hiring problem, or inside trojanized distant conferencing software program reminiscent of MiroTalk or FreeConference.

BeaverTail acts as a easy login stealer, extracting browser databases containing saved logins, and as a downloader for the second stage, InvisibleFerret. That is modular Python-based malware that features spyware and adware and backdoor parts, and can also be able to downloading the professional AnyDesk distant administration and monitoring software program for post-compromise actions. Determine 6 reveals the total compromise chain from preliminary compromise, by means of knowledge exfiltration, to the deployment of AnyDesk.

Each BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret have been beforehand documented by Unit 42, Group-IB, and Objective-See. A parallel investigation was additionally revealed by Zscaler, whose findings we will independently verify. Our evaluation comprises particulars that haven’t been publicly reported earlier than and presents a complete overview of the malicious exercise.

BeaverTail

BeaverTail is the identify for the infostealer and downloader malware utilized by DeceptiveDevelopment. There are two totally different variations – one written in JavaScript and positioned straight into the trojanized tasks with easy obfuscation, and native variations, constructed utilizing the Qt platform, which are disguised as conferencing software program and have been initially described by Objective-See. Each variations have sturdy similarities of their functionalities.

This malware targets Home windows, Linux, and macOS programs, with the goal of gathering saved login info and cryptocurrency pockets knowledge.

It begins by getting the C&C IP tackle and port. Whereas the IP addresses range, the ports used are often both 1224 or 1244, making the malicious community exercise simply identifiable. Within the JavaScript model, the IP tackle and port are obfuscated utilizing base64 encoding, cut up into three components, and swapped round to forestall automated decoding. Different strings are additionally encoded with base64, typically with one dummy character prepended to the ensuing string to thwart easy decoding makes an attempt. The native model has the IP, port, and different strings all saved in plaintext. The obfuscated JavaScript code may be seen in Determine 7, and the deobfuscated code in Determine 8.

BeaverTail then seems to be for browser extensions put in within the Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Opera, and Courageous browsers and checks whether or not any of them match extension names from a hardcoded listing from Chrome Internet Retailer or Microsoft Edge Add-ons, proven beneath. The browser listed in parentheses is the supply of the extension; be aware that each Opera and Courageous additionally use extensions from Chrome Internet Retailer, as they’re Chromium-based.

• nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn – MetaMask (Chrome)
• ejbalbakoplchlghecdalmeeeajnimhm – MetaMask (Edge)
• fhbohimaelbohpjbbldcngcnapndodjp – BNB Chain Pockets (Chrome)
• hnfanknocfeofbddgcijnmhnfnkdnaad – Coinbase Pockets (Chrome)
• ibnejdfjmmkpcnlpebklmnkoeoihofec – TronLink (Chrome)
• bfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnjophhpkkoljpa – Phantom (Chrome)
• fnjhmkhhmkbjkkabndcnnogagogbneec – Ronin Pockets (Chrome)
• aeachknmefphepccionboohckonoeemg – Coin98 Pockets (Chrome)
• hifafgmccdpekplomjjkcfgodnhcellj – Crypto.com Pockets (Chrome)

If they’re discovered, any .ldb and .log recordsdata from the extensions’ directories are collected and exfiltrated.

Aside from these recordsdata, the malware additionally targets a file containing the Solana keys saved within the consumer’s house listing in .config/solana/id.json. BeaverTail then seems to be for saved login info in /Library/Keychains/‌login.keychain (for macOS) or /.native/share/keyrings/ (for Linux). In the event that they exist, the Firefox login databases key3.db, key4.db, and logins.json from /.mozilla/firefox/ are additionally exfiltrated throughout this time.

Every BeaverTail pattern comprises a sufferer ID used for identification. These IDs are used all through the entire compromise chain as identifiers in all downloads and uploads. We suspect that these IDs are distinctive to every sufferer and are used to attach the stolen info to the sufferer’s public profile.

The collected knowledge together with the pc hostname and present timestamp is uploaded to the /uploads API endpoint on the C&C server. Then, a standalone Python surroundings is downloaded in an archive referred to as p2.zip, hosted on the C&C server, to allow execution of the following stage. Lastly, the following stage is downloaded from the C&C server (API endpoint /shopper/<campaign_ID>) into the consumer’s house listing underneath the identify .npl and executed utilizing the downloaded Python surroundings.

In August 2024, we noticed a brand new model of the JavaScript BeaverTail, the place the code positioned within the trojanized mission acted solely as a loader and downloaded and executed the precise payload code from a distant server. This model additionally used a distinct obfuscation approach and added 4 new cryptocurrency pockets extensions to the listing of targets:

• jblndlipeogpafnldhgmapagcccfchpi – Kaia Pockets (Chrome)
• acmacodkjbdgmoleebolmdjonilkdbch – Rabby Pockets (Chrome)
• dlcobpjiigpikoobohmabehhmhfoodbb – Argent X – Starknet Pockets (Chrome)
• aholpfdialjgjfhomihkjbmgjidlcdno – Exodus Web3 Pockets (Chrome)

When investigating the ipcheck[.]cloud web site, we observed that the homepage is a mirror of the malicious mirotalk[.]web web site, serving native BeaverTail malware disguised as distant conferencing software program, indicating a direct connection between the brand new JavaScript and the native variations of BeaverTail.

InvisibleFerret

InvisibleFerret is modular Python malware with capabilities for info theft and distant attacker management. It consists of 4 modules – most important (the .npl file), payload (pay), browser (bow), and AnyDesk (adc). The malware has no persistence mechanism in place other than the AnyDesk shopper deployed on the finish of the compromise chain. After gaining persistence through AnyDesk, the attackers can execute InvisibleFerret at will.

Apparently, most of its backdoor performance requires an operator (or scripted conduct) on the different facet sending instructions, deciding what knowledge to exfiltrate and find out how to propagate the assault. In all variations of InvisibleFerret that we noticed, the backdoor parts are activated upon operator command. The one performance not executed by the operator is the preliminary fingerprinting, which is completed mechanically.

Primary module

The principle module, initially named most important, is the .npl file that BeaverTail downloaded from the C&C server and saved into the house listing. It’s answerable for downloading and executing particular person payload modules. All modules include an XOR-encrypted and base64-encoded payload, preceded by 4 bytes representing the XOR key, adopted by code to decrypt and execute it through exec, as seen in Determine 9. Every module additionally comprises the sType variable, containing the present sufferer ID. This ID is a duplicate of the ID specified within the obtain request. When a request is made to obtain the script file, the given ID is positioned because the sType worth into the ultimate script file by the C&C server’s API.

This module comprises a hardcoded C&C tackle encoded with base64 and cut up into two halves which were swapped to make decoding more durable. Normally that we noticed, this tackle was equivalent to the one used within the previous BeaverTail pattern. The principle module downloads the payload module from /payload/<campaign_ID> to .n2/pay within the consumer’s house listing and executes it. Afterwards, if operating on macOS (decided by checking whether or not a name to the platform.system operate returns Darwin), it exits. On different working programs it additionally downloads the browser module from /forehead/<campaign_ID> to .n2/bow within the consumer’s house listing and executes that in a separate Python occasion.

Payload module

The pay module consists of two components – one collects info and the opposite serves as a backdoor. The primary half comprises a hardcoded C&C URL, often much like the beforehand used ones, and collects the next:

• the consumer’s UUID,
• OS kind,
• PC identify,
• username,
• system model (launch),
• native IP tackle, and
• public IP tackle and geolocation info (area identify, nation, metropolis, ZIP code, ISP, latitude and longitude) parsed from http://ip-api.com/json.

This info, illustrated in Determine 10, is then uploaded to the /keys API endpoint utilizing HTTP POST.

The second half acts as a TCP backdoor, and a TCP reverse shell, accepting distant instructions from the C&C server and speaking through a socket connection. It often makes use of port 1245, however we additionally noticed ports 80, 2245, 3001, and 5000. Notably, the C&C IP tackle hardcoded on this half was totally different from the earlier ones typically, in all probability to separate the extra suspicious remaining community exercise from the preliminary deployment.

The second payload checks whether or not it’s executing underneath Home windows – whether it is, it allows a keylogger applied utilizing pyWinHook and a clipboard stealer utilizing pyperclip, proven in Determine 11. These accumulate and retailer any keypresses and clipboard modifications in a worldwide buffer and run in a devoted thread for so long as the script itself is operating.

Afterwards, it executes the backdoor performance, which consists of eight instructions, described in Desk 3.

Desk 3. Instructions applied in InvisibleFerret

Every command is known as with the prefix ssh_ and assigned a numerical worth for use when speaking with the server. For every command acquired, a brand new thread is spawned to execute it and the shopper instantly begins listening for the following command. Replies to instructions are despatched asynchronously because the instructions end executing. The 2-way communication is completed over sockets, in JSON format, with two fields:

• command – denoting the numerical command ID.
• args – containing any further knowledge despatched between the server and shopper.

The script additionally comprises lists of excluded file and listing names (reminiscent of cache and short-term directories for software program tasks and repositories) to be skipped when exfiltrating knowledge, and a listing of attention-grabbing identify patterns to exfiltrate (surroundings and configuration recordsdata; paperwork, spreadsheets, and different recordsdata containing the phrases secret, pockets, personal, password, and many others.)

Browser module

The bow module is answerable for stealing login knowledge, autofill knowledge, and cost info saved by internet browsers. The focused browsers are Chrome, Courageous, Opera, Yandex, and Edge, all Chromium-based, with a number of variations listed for every of the three main working programs (Home windows, Linux, macOS) as proven in Determine 13.

It searches by means of the browser’s native storage folders (an instance is proven in Determine 14) and copies the databases containing login and cost info to the %Temp% folder on Home windows or the /tmp folder on different programs, into two recordsdata:

• LoginData.db containing consumer login info, and
• webdata.db containing saved cost info (bank cards).

As a result of the saved passwords and bank card numbers are saved in an encrypted format utilizing AES, they should be decrypted earlier than exfiltration. The encryption keys used for this are obtained based mostly on the working system in use. On Home windows, they’re extracted from the browser’s Native State file, on Linux they’re obtained by means of the secretstorage package, and on macOS they’re obtained by means of the security utility, as illustrated in Determine 15.

The collected info (see Determine 16) is then despatched to the C&C server through an HTTP POST request to the /keys API endpoint.

AnyDesk module

The adc module is the one persistence mechanism discovered on this compromise chain, organising AnyDesk entry to the sufferer’s laptop utilizing a configuration file containing hardcoded login credentials.

On Home windows, it checks whether or not the C:/Program Information (x86)/AnyDesk/AnyDesk.exe exists. If not, it downloads anydesk.exe from the C&C server (http://<C&C_IP>:<C&C_port>/anydesk.exe) into the consumer’s house listing.

Then it makes an attempt to arrange AnyDesk for entry by the attacker by getting into hardcoded password hash, password salt, and token salt values into the configuration recordsdata. If the configuration recordsdata don’t exist or don’t include a given attacker-specified password salt worth, the module makes an attempt to switch them so as to add the hardcoded login info. If that fails, it creates a PowerShell script within the consumer’s house listing named conf.ps1, containing code to switch the configuration recordsdata (proven in Determine 17) and makes an attempt to launch it.

After these actions full, the AnyDesk course of is killed after which began once more to load the brand new configuration. Lastly, the adc module makes an attempt to delete itself by calling the os.remove function on itself.

InvisibleFerret replace

We later found an up to date model of InvisibleFerret with main modifications, used since not less than August 2024. It’s now not separated into particular person modules, however quite exists as a single giant script file (however nonetheless retaining the backdoor instructions to selectively set up the browser and AnyDesk modules). There are additionally slight code modifications for elevated help of macOS, for instance gathering the username together with the hostname of the pc.

One other modification we noticed is the addition of an identifier named gType, along with sType. It acts as a secondary sufferer/marketing campaign identifier along with sType when downloading modules from the C&C server (e.g., <C&C_IP>:<port>/<module>/<sType>/<gType>). We haven’t seen it used to label the exfiltrated knowledge.

This new model of InvisibleFerret has additionally applied an extra backdoor command, ssh_zcp, able to exfiltrating knowledge from browser extensions and password managers through Telegram and FTP.

With the brand new command, InvisibleFerret first seems to be for and, if current, collects knowledge from 88 browser extensions for the Chrome, Courageous, and Edge browsers after which locations it right into a staging folder within the system’s short-term listing. The whole listing of extensions may be discovered within the Appendix and the code for gathering the info is proven in Determine 18.

Aside from the extension knowledge, the command may also exfiltrate info from the Atomic and Exodus cryptocurrency wallets on all programs, along with 1Password, Electrum, WinAuth, Proxifier4, and Dashlane on Home windows. That is illustrated in Determine 19.

The information is then archived and uploaded to a Telegram chat utilizing the Telegram API with a bot token, in addition to to an FTP server. As soon as the add is completed, InvisibleFerret removes each the staging folder and the archive.

Clipboard stealer module

In December 2024 we found one more model of InvisibleFerret, containing an extra module named mlip, downloaded from the C&C endpoint /mclip/<campaign_ID> to .n2/mlip. This module comprises the keylogging and clipboard-stealing performance that was separated from the remainder of the payload module.

Exhibiting an development in technical capabilities of the operators, the keylogging and clipboard stealing performance of this module has been restricted to 2 processes solely, chrome.exe and courageous.exe, whereas the sooner variations of InvisibleFerret logged any and all keystrokes. The collected knowledge is uploaded to a brand new API endpoint, /api/clip.

Community infrastructure

DeceptiveDevelopment’s community infrastructure consists of devoted servers hosted by industrial internet hosting suppliers, with the three mostly used suppliers being RouterHosting (now referred to as Cloudzy), Stark Industries Options, and Pier7ASN. The server API is written in Node.js and consists of 9 endpoints, listed in Desk 4.

Desk 4. DeceptiveDevelopment C&C API endpoints

Most C&C communication we noticed was executed over ports 1224 or 1244 (often 80 or 3000) for C&C communication over HTTP, and 1245 (often 80, 2245, 3001, 5000, or 5001) for backdoor C&C communication over TCP sockets. All communication from the shopper to the C&C server, besides downloading the Python surroundings, comprises the marketing campaign ID. For InvisibleFerret downloads, the ID is added to the tip of the URL within the GET request. For knowledge exfiltration, the ID is shipped as a part of the POST request within the kind discipline. That is helpful for figuring out community visitors and figuring out what particular pattern and marketing campaign it belongs to.

The marketing campaign IDs (sType and gType values) we noticed are alphanumeric and don’t appear to bear any direct relation to the marketing campaign. Earlier than the introduction of gType, among the sType values have been base64 strings containing variants of the phrase crew and numbers, reminiscent of 5Team9 and 7tEaM;. After gType was launched, most noticed values for each values have been purely numeric, with out using base64.

Conclusion

The DeceptiveDevelopment cluster is an addition to an already giant assortment of money-making schemes employed by North Korea-aligned actors and conforms to an ongoing development of shifting focus from conventional cash to cryptocurrencies. Throughout our analysis, we noticed it go from primitive instruments and strategies to extra superior and succesful malware, in addition to extra polished strategies to lure in victims and deploy the malware. Any on-line job-hunting and freelancing platform may be prone to being abused for malware distribution by faux recruiters. We proceed to look at important exercise associated to this marketing campaign and anticipate DeceptiveDevelopment to proceed innovating and trying to find extra methods to focus on cryptocurrency customers.

For any inquiries about our analysis revealed on WeLiveSecurity, please contact us at threatintel@eset.com. 

ESET Analysis presents personal APT intelligence studies and knowledge feeds. For any inquiries about this service, go to the ESET Threat Intelligence web page.

IoCs

A complete listing of indicators of compromise (IoCs) and samples may be present in our GitHub repository.

Information

Community

MITRE ATT&CK strategies

This desk was constructed utilizing version 16 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

Appendix

Following is a listing of browser extensions focused by the brand new InvisibleFerret: